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Decentralization  since   early   1990s   has   become   one   of   the
buzzwords of the development paradigms. Among all ingredients
of decentralization, the fiscal component of it has a special
significance.   Not   surprisingly   the   literature   unanimously
recognizes   that   it   is   the  regulation   of   intergovernmental
relationships in the fiscal arena that can strike the right balance
among different objectives of each level and resolve tensions
between them. Thus, the fiscal decentralization is in vogue. The
trend that began in 90s has only gained momentum at the turn of
the century. Yet the outcome of adopting similar policies has not
been uniform across the globe. Some have succeeded, some
are stumbling and some others have failed. In fact, the success
of decentralization depends on its design. The paper looks into
various  questions  associated with the dilemma of designing
decentralization   instruments   for   the   success   of   fiscal
decentralization   These include the question of designing the
right   mix   of   policies,   the   questions   of   sequencing   and
synchronization, the question of pace and that of balancing the
contrasting forces of centralization and decentralization.  The
paper offers the insight to the policymakers that while designing
fiscal decentralization they should not try to replicate any ‘ideal
type’ solution. Though the ideal types can be powerful analytical
tools, yet they do not lead to solutions for specific situations Real
world fiscal arrangements rarely follow the idealized model; they
are loaded with historical developments and political  ad hoc
solutions. It is simply not realistic to start from tabula rasa. The
paper emphasizes that there is no “one size fits all” type answer
to decentralization question. All systems will have to work out
their own style of going about decentralization and restructuring
of intergovernmental relations depending on the context and
conditions peculiar to their own situation. The paper also argues
that any attempt towards fiscal decentralization must be firmly
grounded in the basic principles of fiscal federalism, irrespective
of  the   fact   whether   the   country   in   question   is   an   officially
declared   federal   state   or   not.   Thus   while   implementing
decentralization policies, the need is to ‘bring the federal back
in’. 
There is a world wide trend toward increasing transfer of power,
resources   and   responsibilities   to   the   subnational   levels   of
government.   Both   federal   and   unitary   countries,   whether
industrialized   or   developing   are   moving   toward   more   fiscal
decentralization.   This   trend   towards   greater   fiscal
decentralization that   began in  1980’s   with many  developing
countries embarking on the path to devolve more functions to the
local jurisdictions, gained momentum during 9o’s.  Paul Smoke
(2001) asserts that during the 1990s, fiscal decentralization and
local   government   reform   have   become   among   the   most
widespread trends in development. This trend, according to Ter-
Minassian (1997), is evident not only in federal countries but also
in many unitary  countries  including some that  have a long
tradition of centralist government. Political developments in Latin
America, Asia and Africa point toward a trend en route for
increasing   decentralization.   The   trend   is   visible   in   post
communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The trend can
also be observed even in essentially centralized countries such
as Jordan and  Morocco.    Countries  like India,  Mexico and
Pakistan are also trying to improve upon their fiscal federal
arrangements   to  make   them   more  responsive  and  efficient.
Certain studies have shown that out of the 75 developing and
transition countries with populations greater than 5 million, 63
have   embarked   on   some   form   of   fiscal   decentralization
(Helmsing, 1999, Robert D.Ebel, 2001). In fact addressing
the   challenge   of   devising   best   achievable   array   of
assignment of functions and responsibilities is, in words of
Richard Bird (1993) “…a question at the centre of policy
debate in countries around the world.”    In order to address
the   dilemma   of   design  section   I  sets   the   context   by
highlighting   the   cases   of   decentralization   failure,   thus
underpinning the relevance and gravity of the said dilemma.
This naturally leads to the question of ensuring success that
is taken up in the section II. This section deals with many
popular questions relating to design and pace for ensuring
success of decentralization policies. The paper reviews the
existing literature (subsections A to E) and highlights that
there is no single right strategy or design that could be
projected as “success mantra” for all countries. However
while customizing decentralization to strike their own chord;
the policy makers must not lose sight of the basic principles
of fiscal federalism (as highlighted in the conclusion).  
I. Decentralization Failure: 
There   is   an   ample   evidence   to   prove   that   an
overenthusiastic   and   imbalanced   approach   to   fiscal
decentralization can produce a market-distorting effect (as
against market preserving). This has happened in case of
Brazil and Argentina. Brazil is an example of an unbalanced
federal system where states and municipalities have won.
They dominate the union and compete among themselves in
a   disorganized   and   predatory   fashion.   Experience   of
Argentina  shows   that   perversely   structured   systems   of
intergovernmental finance can destabilize public sector and
economy   as   a   whole.   The   World   Development   Report
1999/2000 (Chap 5) has arrived at certain observations in
this regard:  (a) Decentralization if improperly pursued can
lower the quality of public services as in Latin America and
Russia. (Chap 5,  end note 13).   (b) A poorly handled
decentralization can threaten macroeconomic stability (Chap
5,  endnote   26).   (c)   Fiscal   decentralization   reduces   the
central   government’s   control   over  public   resources   thus
hampering a government’s ability to respond to economic
shocks.  The government  of  Philippines  for  example,  is
required to share nearly half of its internal tax revenues with
subnational governments, limiting its ability to adjust budget
in response to shocks. (Ch.5 p 111).  
Further there are many studies that conclude that under
certain circumstances  fiscal decentralization may produce
the results  exactly opposite to what  pro-decentralization
literature may assert. For instance: (a) Spillovers, common
pool problems and problems from soft budget constraints
result in efficiency losses associated with decentralization
(Inman and Rubinfeld 1997, Sanguinetti 1994,     Rodden
2000, Stein 1998, Wildasin 1997 and Willis, Garman and
Haggard 1998).    (b) Davoodi and Zou have found in their
studies that fiscal decentralization is associated with slower
economic growth.(Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Xie, Zou and
Davoodi, 1999) (c) In some studies local Governments were
found   to   be   more   corrupt   &   decentralization   in   certain
studies has been shown to be leading directly to greater
state capture (Goldsmith, 1999, Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2000). (d) It has also been argued that there is no significant
relationship   between   fiscal   decentralization   and   public
sector size (Oates, 1985; Nelson, 1986). Thus the assertion
that it limits the size of public sector is not true.
What is more serious is that if ‘decentralization’ aspect is
stretched to its extreme it can even encourage and incite
separatist tendencies as is happening in Italy.
 Wallace E.
Oates (1999), have stated that in Italy the movement toward
decentralization has gone so far as to encompass a serious
proposal   for   the   separation   of   the   nation   into   two
independent countries (p1120). 
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limits   of   a  ‘largely’  decentralized
distribution of powers in terms of inducing
and   maintaining   federal   cohesion.   Most
unique   experiment   was   that   of  West
Indies, which assigned very few powers to
the federal government, so much so that
there was a significant lack of financial
resources even to make those trim powers
effective   that   were   entrusted   to   the
federation. Within a short time it became
obvious   that   the   sense   of   community
shared by the islands was not sufficient to
hold   the   federation   together.   This   was
exacerbated   by   the   relative   paucity   of
powers to generate support for the federal
government. Following the succession of
Jamaica and then Trinidad, the “salt water
federation” was officially dissolved by the
British Government in 1962, only five years
after   its   foundation   in   1957.     Another
instance is of  Bosnia Herzegovina. The
country adopted federalist structure under
Dyton   Peace   Agreement.   But   the
agreement seriously compromised some
basic principles of “fiscal federalism” and
powers   of   the   state   with   respect   to
subcentral units were highly curtailed. The
state now faces the challenge of carrying
out even its minimal responsibilities, since
it   relies   on   transfers   from   the   entities.
Moreover, since central government has
little   resources   and   power   to   offset
regional imbalances, large inequalities are
likely to develop among and within the
entities   (as   economic   conditions   differ
substantially across the country) (Fox and
Wallich 1997).  It is in such context that
Prud’homme   (1995)   warned   against
potential dangers of decentralization and
Vito Tanzi(1996)  challenged   the  role  of
decentralization   as   a   means   to   foster
growth and development. Some authors
have   even   argued   that   in   post   Soviet
context,  greater   centralization   is   in   fact
required (Polishchuk, 2000, Stoner Weiss,
2001).   Thus   the   recent   literature   on
centralization-decentralization debate tilts
in favour of the argument that in case of
developing   and   transition   economies
existence   of   strong   center   (political
centralization)   at   least   in   short   run   is
required.  In a short-term perspective and
under the strong pressure of both radical
and “over the night” systematic economic
and   political   reforms,   sometimes   even
accompanied   by   state   transition,
decentralization need not necessarily be a
prerequisite   for   good   governance.
According to Luiz de Mello and Matias
Barenstein     (2001),   “Because
improvements in governance take time to
mature, fiscal decentralization should  not
be   used   as   a   catalyst   for   improving
governance” 
In fact the policy oriented research has
clearly demonstrated that the tendency in
public   policy   discussion   to   distinguish
between economic objectives on the one
hand,   and   political   and   constitutional
objectives on the other, is inappropriate.
Real   world   fiscal   arrangements   rarely
follow the idealized model; they are loaded
with historical developments and political
ad hoc solutions. It is simply not realistic to
start   from  tabula   rasa.  In   any   case,
economic fundamentals are not the only
logic of good governance. Though the ideal
types can be powerful analytical tools, yet
they do not lead to solutions for specific
situations.
II. The Question of Ensuring Success: 
The above description shows two things.
Firstly, it shows that the decentralization is
now a political reality world-wide (though it
varies greatly in form within and among
countries)   and   secondly   that   there   are
cases when decentralization fails to deliver.
Implication of the first is that the debate on
whether decentralization  is   good or  bad
has lost its relevance. Implication of the
second point is that the debate now has
shifted   to   the   problem   of   designing
instruments   and   ensuring   conditions   for
success of decentralization. 
In recent decentralization literature it has
been emphasized that decentralization  in
itself is neither good nor bad (IBRD, 2000;
107).   The   implementation   of   similar
decentralization   policies   in   different
countries may produce different outcomes
depending   on   the   specificities   of   the
country in question, such as the strength of
existing   institutions   and   legacies   of
centralization.     The   World   Development
Report (1999, pp 107-124) asserts that the
question   today   is   not   whether
decentralization is good or bad, the more
important   question   is   whether   it   is
successful or not. It says that successful
decentralization   improves   the   efficiency
and responsiveness of the public sector
while accommodating potentially explosive
political   forces   whereas   unsuccessful
decentralization   threatens   economic   and
political stability and disrupts the delivery of
the public services. The report argues that
the success of decentralization depends on
its design. 
It is generally argued that decentralization
of government in terms of devolution, can
improve   governance   by   fostering
accountability,  participation,   and
transparency.  But devolution in itself does
not guarantee better governance. Indeed,
ineffective or improper devolution creates
more problems than it solves. Therefore, it
is vital that decentralization instruments are
carefully   crafted   keeping   in   view   the
specific context of the country in question.
The   idea   here   is   to   reinforce   the
importance of effective planning and design
in undertaking decentralization.
A.  Striking the Right Mix of Policy
Instruments: 
  At least seven components of designing
decentralization are crucial for its success.
The   aim   is   to   create   institutions   which
provide disincentives for citizens to free-
ride or for decision-makers at various levels
of government to either overgraze the fiscal
commons or evade responsibility for
citizens   whose   needs   place
disproportionate   burdens   on   public
expenditure:    1.   Finance   should
follow   function:   Revenue   raising
authority   must   be   linked,   at   the
margin   to   the   service   provision
responsibilities.   2.   Informed   public
opinion:   There   should   be   local
access to right information to enable
the   local   community   to   develop
meaningful public opinion and decide
priorities.  3. Mechanisms for making
local priorities known must be put in
place.     4.   Credible   incentives   for
people   to   participate:   Writers   on
institutional   economics   have   long
observed that people’s willingness to
participate varies according to their
perception of how much impact such
participation   will   have   (Hirschman,
1970;   North,   1990;   Ostrom   and
others 1993). 5. Adherence to local
priorities: There should be compelling
incentives   for   politicians   to   be
responsive   and   accountable.   6.
Appropriate   incentives   for   sub
national   governments   to   maintain
fiscal responsibility: It is argued that
destabilization   effects   of
decentralization   arose   mainly   from
inappropriate   incentives   than   any
problem inherent in decentralization
(Spahn 1997) including soft budget
constraints. 7. Designing instruments
of decentralization to support political
objectives:   The   instruments   of
decentralization at the disposal of a
policy   maker   are:     (i)   Legal
institutional framework. (ii) Structure
of   service   delivery   responsibilities.
(iii) Allocation of various taxes among
different levels of the government. (iv)
Intergovernmental   transfers     (v)
Central   government   controls   and
constraints   upon   sub   national
borrowing     (vi)   Local   government
election rules. 
Decentralization   is   a   mixture   of
administrative,   fiscal   and   political
functions and relationships. In design
of decentralization all three must be
included.   However,   applying   these
principles in practice is a complicated
task.     This   is   because   different
decentralization   instruments   (taken
independently) will produce different
consequences for different objectives
(such   as   economic   efficiency,
macroeconomic   stability,   income
redistribution and political efficiency)
under   different   circumstances.   The
‘right mix of the policy instruments’
has to be shaped while taking into
account specific circumstances of the
country   concerned.   It   is   thus   not
possible   to   propose   a
‘decentralization model’ that would fit
all   the   countries.  To   quote
Prud’Homme(2001),   “   They   (policy
makers) are like a composer writing a
symphony   for   a   number   of
instruments;   the   quality   of   the
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written for each instrument and also upon
the   combination   of     the   many   melodic
lines.”
B. The Question of Synchronization and
Sequencing:
 
Burki   and   others   (1999)   have   argued
‘Decentralization often takes  place amid
political   and   economic   turmoil…Even
where   decentralization   happens   in   less
dramatic context, questions of strategy and
timing   still   arise….There   is   clearly   no
blueprint   for   decentralization…..(but)   the
most   consistent   lesson   of   recent
decentralization experience is the need to
synchronize the elements of reform.”   
Decentralization   is   a   mixture   of
administrative, fiscal and political functions
and   relationships.   In   the   design   of
decentralization systems all three must be
included.   [Cohen   and   Peterson   1999,
Schneider 2003, Manor 1997]. Schneider
makes the distinction between these three
dimensions. “Fiscal decentralization refers
to how much of the money collected and
spent by government goes through non-
central government entities. Administrative
decentralization   refers   to   how   much
autonomy non-central government entities
have   relative   to   central   control.   Finally,
political   decentralization   refers   to   the
degree to which non-central government
entities   satisfy   the   political   functions   of
governance, such as representation”. He
further   states   that   there   is   a   range   of
possible ways in which these dimensions
could interact. One possible pattern is that
increasing   decentralization   in   one
dimension   leads   to   an   increase   in
decentralization   in   other   dimension.   A
second   pattern   is   that   increasing
decentralization in one dimension leads to
a decrease in decentralization in another
dimension.  With  three dimensions  there
are   six   combinations.   For   example
changes in fiscal decentralization can be
either positively or negatively related to
changes   in   administrative   or   political
decentralization. The interaction could be
more complex; in which decentralization
along two dimensions augments or offsets
decentralization   along   the   third.
Alternatively,   decentralization   along   one
dimension might augment decentralization
along another, but this relation might not
work in  reverse.   These  possibilities  are
however, difficult to test statistically. 
Thus it is not surprising that attempts to
find causal relation have produced mixed,
inconclusive or at best conditional results.
Kent Eaton (2003) in his study evaluates a
hypothesis   that,   ‘it   is   the   democratic
election   of   sub-national   officials   in
particular   that   unleashes   powerful   and
ultimately irresistible pressures from below
for greater fiscal decentralization. In this
view, fiscal authority follows elections’. The
question   asked   is   whether   political
decentralization   has   caused   fiscal
decentralization?   According   to   the
research   presented   by   the   author,
elections   for   sub-national   offices   in  the
20th century quite consistently led to fiscal
decentralization in Argentina and Brazil, but
not in Chile and Uruguay. Schneider (2003)
speculates, “Fiscal decentralization might
generate   greater   administrative
decentralization. This would occur if local
units used increased resources for a power
grab and asserted administrative autonomy
from   the   centre.   Alternatively,   fiscal
decentralization   might   lead   to   less
administrative decentralization. This would
occur if central governments systematically
tried to counteract any release of resources
with   an   increase   in   bureaucratic   or
regulatory controls”. 
Thus the issue of matching fiscal, political
and   administrative   arrangements   to
achieve the optimal mix is a difficult but
important   design   issue.   Such   policy
synchronization is  difficult  because  each
service and even each function within a
service will differ with regard to appropriate
form   of   decentralization.   Thus   the
challenge of designing decentralization has
been   linked   to   a   soufflé   where   all
ingredients must be present in the right
amounts and prepared in the right way to
achieve success (Parker, 1995).
Another   related   aspect   of   designing
decentralization   is   that   of   proper
sequencing. Though it is widely accepted
that both political and fiscal decentralization
are   complementary   to   each   other   for
overall success of the programme
1 but the
question is of sequencing.  The question is
sometimes   posed   as   to   whether   fiscal
decentralization should precede or follow
political   decentralization?   There   are
scholarly works justifying both sides of the
argument. Jamie Boex (2001) asserts,” An
important   precondition   of   fiscal
decentralization   is   political
decentralization.”   (p,3).   He   argues   that
fiscal decentralization is the “assignment of
fiscal   decision   making   power   and
management responsibilities to lower levels
of the government. This definition implicitly
assumes   that   subnational   governments
have a certain degree of fiscal discretion
and   are   accountable   to   their   regional
constituents.   Nothing   but   political
decentralization provide local governments
with real decision making power, which is
neither   provided   by   deconcentration   nor
delegation as subnational governments  in
such   forms   of   decentralization
(predominantly administrative ) continue to
be accountable to the center, as opposed
to being responsive to the local populace
that they serve” (p3). Wildasin (1995) also
puts   political   conditions   for   success   of
fiscal decentralization. He argues that the
presumption that fiscal decentralization is
conducive to allocative efficiency “depend
critically   on   the   decision   making
mechanism of lower level government and
on   the   constraints   on   local   decision
makers, for example the ease with which
households and firms can escape or enter
localities   in   response   to   their   fiscal
attractiveness or lack thereof. If “exit” is
constrained   and   there   are   no   effective
channels   for   “voice”,   there   is   no
particular presumption in support of
the view that fiscal decentralization
enhances   allocative   efficiency”.   He
argues   that  enhancing   the
responsiveness  of local institutions,
either by democratizing them or by
making them more competitive is a
task   that   warrants   explicit
consideration   in   the   developing
country   context.  But   adds    in   a
footnote (fn2) that the example of the
competitive   firm   shows   that
democratization   (political
decentralization) is not always crucial
for allocative efficiency.  Democratic
political reform may be important for
the success of some types of fiscal
decentralization  but  not necessarily
for all.
 
On the other side of the spectrum lies
the sweeping argument that bringing
political decentralization prior to fiscal
decentralization is like putting the cart
before   the   horse.  Bardhan   and
Mookherjee (1998) argue that if local
accountability is limited (which is best
ensured by devolving fiscal authority
2), political decentralization will lead
to   local   capture.   Political
decentralization may therefore simply
transfer power from national to local
elites. In this respect,  it has often
been   argued   that   the   institutional
foundations   for  fiscal   federalism,
such   as   revenue-sharing
arrangements and expenditure rules,
should be in place before political
decentralization   and   political
liberalization   begins.   As   Burki   and
others   (1999)   have   argued,   “The
political   impetus   behind
decentralization   prompts   central
governments   to   make   political
concessions   hastily.   But   granting
local elections is a step that can be
taken rapidly. What is difficult is the
working   through   new   regulatory
relations   between   central   and
subnational   governments   and
working   out   a   system   of   tax
assignment,   intergovernmental
transfers   and   transfer   of   central
government assets” (p33).
In the case of Russia  according to
Word   Bank   Development   Report
1999-2000,  the   fact   that   political
decentralization   preceded   fiscal
decentralization, may also have had
an   adverse   effect   on   macro
instability.   The   report   says  “…
sometimes   in   the   process   of
decentralization cart is put before the
horse i.e. political decentralization is
brought first. It happens also because
political   impetus   behind
decentralization   prompts   central
governments   to   make   concessions
hastily.   Further,   granting   local
elections is a step that can be taken
rapidly. But making decentralization a
success requires taking a number of
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regulatory   relationships   between   central
and   subcentral   governments,   transfers
assets and staff to local levels and replace
annual budgetary transfers with a system
of tax assignment and intergovernmental
transfers.  The   recent   history   of
decentralization illustrates the dangers of
not sequencing appropriately”. Thus World
Bank Report offers the policy direction “Put
expenditure and revenue rules   in  place
before political liberalization”. (World Bank
Report 1999-2000). Olivier Blanchard and
Andrei   Shleifer’s   (2000)   analysis   also
suggest   that   federalism   in   Russia   has
failed   precisely   because   of   political
decentralization. “There is no question that
carefully   designed   tax   and   other   fiscal
policies can raise  the share of revenues
from   additional   growth   going   to   local
governments  in   Russia.   Nevertheless,
given   the   low   level   of   political
centralization, such fiscal measures may
not   be   enough   to   induce   local
governments to foster growth”. (p10).
The diversity in above studies is indicative
of   the   imperative   call   for   revisiting   the
propositions regarding mutual interactions
of political and fiscal decentralization in
context of globalization. To refer to another
trend in the literature mention could be
made   of   a   recent   paper   by   Geoffrey
Garrett   and   Jonathan   Rodden   (2001).
They  show that globalization have had a
different   impact   on   political   and   fiscal
decentralization. The authors thus contrast
the   likely   effects   of   globalization   on
political and fiscal authority. Globalization,
they argue, “may strengthen the credibility
of regional autonomy movements and put
pressure on central governments to cede
policy control to local officials. But it may
also   encourage   regions   that   choose   to
stay   within   countries   to   push   for   fiscal
arrangements that better mitigate market
risk for citizens within their borders. It may
be   a   combination   of  political
decentralization   and   fiscal   centralization
that best achieves these objectives. It is
somewhat   surprising   that   these
conjectures   have   not   made   it   into   the
literature until now”. Thus their recipe for
sequencing and design is exactly opposite
to that proposed by Olivier Blanchard and
Andrei   Shleifer’s   (2000)   and   the   World
Bank   (1999)   which   combines   fiscal
decentralization   with   political
centralization.
Though in light of the above a clear-cut
statement   regarding   the   strategy   or
sequencing of decentralization (in terms of
fiscal first or political first) becomes difficult
to highlight yet to touch the bottom line it
can be said that  political decentralization
and   fiscal   decentralization   are   two
separate   dimensions   and   can   exist
independently in absence of the other. As
Scottish  devolution  shows,   for  example,
substantial political decentralization might
take place without fiscal decentralization.”
[Geoffrey   Garrett   and   Jonathan   Rodden
(2001)] and vice versa.
The foregoing discussion implies that there
is no “one size fits all” type answer  to
decentralization question. All systems will
have to work out their own style of going
about decentralization and restructuring of
intergovernmental relations depending on
the context and conditions peculiar to their
own situation. 
C. The Question of Pace: Incremental or
Big Bang
Another aspect related to policy design is
the   concern   regarding   the   pace   of   the
decentralization   process.   There   are
arguments   favoring   “incremental
decentralization”   as   well   as   “big   bang
decentralization”. Those who support slow,
incremental or partial decentralization draw
attention toward probable downside risks of
decentralization. Most significant among all
is   the   concern   with   decline   in   service
delivery on account of ‘capture by local
elites’ and low technical capabilities of local
government.   It   is   feared   that   (a)   the
possibility is always there that the locally
elected officials will spend the money in
their own interest rather than interest of
their constituents and (b) what is gained in
better information (as the argument goes in
favour of decentralization) may be lost in
lower technical competence/capacity and in
lack of economies of scale. In addition to
this the suggestion to keep the pace slow
also   come   on   the   basis   of   deeply
entrenched   historical   basis   that
centralization   legacy   creates   to   the
disadvantage   of   ongoing   process   of
decentralization.   Thus   Prud’Homme
advices, “A century of centralization cannot
(and should not) be overruled overnight….
(Decentralization) will remain on agenda for
many   years”   (   Prud’Homme,2001)   .
Concerns  with  the  risks  associated  with
decentralization   have   in   fact   prompted
some   Latin   American   and   Caribbean
countries to favour slow, incremental and
piecemeal   decentralization.   Programs
geared   to   strengthening   subnational
government technical capacity have been
implemented in every country in the region.
Incremental approach has also taken the
form of micro monitored earmarking (for
instance, in Mexican approach to sector
decentralization).   Econometric   results
reported in a World bank Report [Shahid
Javed   Burki,   Guillermo   E.   Perry,   and
William R. Dillinger, 1999] suggest that fast
decentralization normally leads to higher
overall   public   expenditures   and   serious
problems in macroeconomic management. 
On   the   other   hand   arguments   such   as
bureaucratic resistance and interests and
attitudes of powerful stakeholders (which
could   be   seen   as   the   outcome   of
centralization legacy) have been used to
argue   for   exactly   opposite   approach   to
decentralization i.e. the big bang approach.
The proponents of big bang approach draw
attention towards the constraints imposed
by   anti   decentralization   coalitions
which, it is expressed, can only be
overcome if a political breakthrough
is   made   by   large   scale
decentralization   rather   than   by
moderate   decentralization.   It   is
feared that policy reform of any sort
will be confronted by vested interests
such as central bureaucrats and local
governments aiming to protect their
privileges, which could install such a
reform or call for a major setback
(Rodrik 1996). Alternatively, different
political groups that are affected by
different policy reforms may form a
coalition   to   halt   these   reforms
altogether ( Wei, 1997). Taking such
concerns  as   justifications,   Motohiro
Sato   (2002)   suggests,   “In   reality
therefore, economic reform plan must
be accompanied by proper tactics to
overcome political  oppositions  from
stakeholders within and outside of a
central   government”.   The   author
shows   that   how   (against   intuition)
large scale decentralization may turn
out to be more successful in forming
a   political   majority   of   pro
decentralization and thus overcoming
the political constraint. It is pointed
out   that   a   small   scale   reform   will
always   remain   constrained   by   a
coalition of rent seeker governments
and   thus   a   theoretical   model   is
provided to prove the case for “big
push”   or   “big   bang”   approach   for
decentralization.  
Keeping in view the above arguments
the bottom line statement one can
arrive at is the assertion that pace
(along with design, sequencing and
proper   mix)   should   be   “optimal”
because each approach has its own
costs and benefits. Optimal pace is
more than highly cautious approach
of gradualism which fails to replace
even the most inefficient institutions.
It   is   on   the   other   hand   less
enthusiastic than the shock therapy
designed   to   replace   the   old
institutions all at once. Thus it aims at
the   best   of   both   worlds.     The
optimality   however,   must   be
ascertained on case by case basis in
accordance with the specificities and
peculiarities   of   the   country   in
question.  Peng Lian and Shang-Jin
Wei (1998) study the economics and
political economy of optimal scale of
reforms.   The  authors  argue  that   if
agents   in   the   economy   are
heterogeneous   in   terms   of   their
subjective   discount   rates,   the
politically-determined   reform   speed
may be lower in a democracy than in
an   economy   with   a   benevolent
dictator.   Prud’Homme(2001)
observes that each country must find
its   own   model   that   best   fits   its
tradition,   geography,   economy,
income   level,   social   structure   and
political choices. Lessons in theory
and study of international experience
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a particular country. 
(D) The Question of Optimum Degree:
Centralization- Decentralization
Continuum
The impression that one gathers from the
literature survey and analytical observation
of the  various cases in point is that one
reason   as   to   why   decentralization   in
certain   cases   is   producing   unintended
consequences   is   probably   that   policy
makers,   while   being  driven   by   political
pressures, fail to diagnose as to what ails
their polities and economies and thereby,
ignore   the   prospects   of   grounding   the
program in deeper appreciation of applying
and   adjusting  principles  of   federal
organization   to   their   county   specific
context.  
Oates (1972) compares the alternatives of
a  centralized   and   decentralized
government   in   terms   of   their   ability   to
deliver the three tasks identified for the
public sector by Musgrave( stabilization,
redistribution and allocation ). He argues
that both the options of centralized and
decentralized   government   have   relative
advantages   and   disadvantages,   so   the
optimal   system   would   be   one   that
combines   the   strengths   of   both   while
avoiding   their   weaknesses:   “a  federal
organization  of   government   meets   this
need.”(Oates 1972, chapter 1, p14). 
In   fact   the   idea   of   balancing   the
contrasting   forces   of   centralization   and
decentralization is central to the concept of
federalism. These two movements are at
work in European Union. The notion of
fiscal   federalism   as   predominantly
centralizing   (unifying)   force   led   to   the
emergence   of   an   integrated   European
Union
3 in November 1993. The Maastricht
Treaty of Nov. 1993 conferred important
new powers on the European Parliament
including   co-decision   making   on
legislation. This creation and evolution of a
new top level of government in Europe in
context of European Monetary Integration
has   significant   spatial   consequences   in
which national factors are gradually losing
relevance with vanishing of old borders
and redistribution of roles at nation and
regional   levels.   The   biggest   riddle
according to Inman and Rubinfeld (1992)
is “the future of the national governments
of the member states”.  However, on the
other hand,  the 'subsidiarity principle’ was
also   formally   adopted   as   a   quasi-
constitutional rule through Article 3b of the
Maastricht-Treaty—which   stipulates   that
the powers of EU institutions be limited to
those functions that cannot be adequately
performed   by   member   states.   More
recently, while on the one hand the notion
that monetary policy be centralized has
gained acceptance among the Europeans,
the idea to centralize fiscal policy in the
European Union (EU) has generally been
rejected. Thus there are contrasting forces
of   centralization   and   decentralization   at
work. 
All this has generated a lot of rethinking on
implications of economic integration within
European Union for the fiscal structure of
EU specifically and on the concept of fiscal
federalism   more   generally.   The
contradictions emerging from the working
of contrasting forces, some leading toward
greater   centralization   and   others   toward
greater decentralization which are at the
heart   of   fiscal   federalism   have   become
more pronounced than ever in the context
of   new   global   economic   order.     This
phenomenon is not restricted to EU but is
also to be seen in those countries which
are moving toward market economy after
failure of centralized planning, in context of
‘globalization’.
The dilemma of balancing the contrasting
forces of centralization and decentralization
that is inherent to the very dynamics of
federalism,   is   more   pronounced   in   the
developing   and   transition   countries,   the
nations   that   are  on   one  hand   trying  to
stabilize their economies while on the other
“… trying to invest more decision making
power in populations that have  long been
disenfranchised” ( Bahl, 1995) thus ideally
trying   to   “combine   the   advantages   of
magnitude   and   littleness   of   nations”
(Tocqueville,1945)   and   in   consequence
getting confronted with the predicament of
resolving the trade off between autonomy
and   efficiency   signifying   a   movement
toward decentralization and centralization
respectively.
Most of the studies on the ‘centralization
versus decentralization issue’ tilt heavily in
favour of decentralization. The arguments
to support this stand are quite familiar. It is
acknowledged   that   decentralization,
besides giving many other advantages may
also   avoid   noted   inefficiencies   of
centralized decision-making such as:
(a) Central officials may often lack detailed
information   about   local   tastes   (Hayek
1948).
(b)   Decision-making   by   a   centralized
legislature may permit a narrow majority of
regions   to   expropriate   the   others,   or
generate norms of reciprocity that result in
overspending   (Besley   and   Coate   2000;
Weingast 1979). 
(c) Central government’s ability to insure
regions   against   exogenous   shocks,
increasing welfare, will create moral hazard
for   the   regions   (Persson   and   Tabellini
1996).
More recent literature however, suggests
that   decentralization,   unless   carried   out
under  the  aegis  of  a reasonably   strong
centre, is doomed to fail. A weak center is
prone  to get  manipulated by the strong
coalitions   and   interest   groups.  There   is
overwhelming consensus that most of the
problems associated with decentralization
can   be   solved   by   central   government
intervention   and   regulatory   powers
entrusted   in   it   (Cumberland   1981,
Gordon1983,   Rivlin   1992,   Wildasin
1989).  While  comparing a case of
strong centre with weak, Blanchard
and Anderei Shleifer (2000), argue
that fiscal decentralization has been
successful in China because centre
in China is strong enough to restrain
destructive behavior of local interests
and   withstand   unhealthy   local
demands.   On   the   other   hand   the
process  in Russia is,  at best, just
wavering, all because of weak centre.
They   show   in   their   study   that
decentralization   in   developing   and
transitional   countries   can   lead   to
capture of local governments. In such
cases   the   authors   argue,   strong
administrative   control   of   local   by
central   authorities   is   important   for
efficient   economic   decentralization.
Thus   for   decentralization   to   be
successful   one   of   the   conditions
(among   others)   is   that   it   must   be
balanced with provision of a strong
central government with ability and
willingness   to   resist   unhealthy
demands   from   lower   levels   of   the
government. This argument endorse
Riker’s   (1964)   suggestion   that
centralization   does   matter   for
federalism to be effective. To move
even earlier one can quote none else
than de Tocqueville, he writes, “From
my perspective, I cannot imagine a
nation   that   could   survive   and
especially   prosper   without   strong
government centralization.” (Oeuvres
Completes, Vol I, 1, p. 87). In 1836
after   living   for   several   months   in
Switzerland   he   wrote   “I   have
developed such an utter disdain for
the   federal   constitution   of
Switzerland,   that   I   would
unequivocally term it a league and
not a  federation.   A  government   of
that nature is certainly the weakest,
the most impotent, the clumsiest and
the   least   capable   of   leading   its
people anywhere except to anarchy
that one could imagine. I am also
struck by the lack of any vie politique
in   its   population.   The   Kingdom   of
England   is   a   hundred   times   more
republican   than   this   republic.”
(Oeuvres Completes, Vol. XV, 1, p.
70-71).
Various   studies   show   that   fiscal
decentralization   may   lead   to
allocative   inefficiencies,   as   well   as
poor accountability and governance,
if   expenditures   and   revenue
mobilization   functions   are   not
properly assigned across the different
levels of the government (Hommes,
1995;     World   Bank,   1999   and
Fukasaku   and   demello,   1999).
Hommes   (1995)   sees
decentralization   as   “essentially   a
political   problem”   representing,   in
Latin America for example, a stark
departure   from   centuries   of
centralism.   The   success   of
decentralization   may   depend   upon
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cultural   tradition—informal   civic
institutions,   such   as   solidarity,
cooperatives,   etc.   With   a   lack   of   local
governmental experience and riddled with
patronage,   local   governments   in   Latin
America tend to be captive of the elites
and political barons. Thus, for Hommes,
an irony of fiscal decentralization may be
the   need   for   more   central   government
controls   to   protect   against   this   danger.
Hommes notes that the seeming paradox
of decentralization is that it demands of the
central   government   more   ‘sophisticated
political   control’.  Ultimately,   however,
effective   decentralization   requires   the
relinquishing of some central control. In
fact the governance literature can help in
exploring the kind of ‘sophisticated control’
that   is   being   considered   more   relevant
than ever in the current scenario. 
This  new role  of the  Center  will not be
identical to the older one where central
government   played   strong-control   and
commanding   role.   As   governments
restructure, role of centre should be that of
“stewardship”.   Peter   Block   argues   that
principles   of   stewardship   bring   a   new
understanding of accountability to each act
of governance. (Peter Block 1993, p. 27).
In this concept, which is quite popular in
literature of management and organization
in United States,  trust  and service and
accountability   are   emphasized.  Central
level   of   government   will   perform   tasks
such   as   “   oversight   and   technical
assistance   to   subnational   governments,
macroeconomic coordination, social safety
nets,  skill enhancement  for international
competitiveness, social and environmental
policy   through   international   agreements”
(Shah, 2004). The task ahead to ensure
this   is   to   strengthen   national   level
institutions. A real test of the strength of
the institution is the ability to successfully
meld   two   goals:   central   authority   and
subcentral   or   decentralized   engagement
and   empowerment   to   ensure   good
democratic governance.
The   foregoing   discussion   demonstrates
that   decentralization   shall   not   be
considered   as   an   alternative   to
centralization.   Both   are   needed.   “The
complementary   roles   of   national   and
subnational actors should be determined
by analyzing the most effective ways and
means of achieving a desired objective.
For   example,   a   national   road   system
should be designed with both local input
and national coordination. Foreign policy
should be a national function based on the
views   of   the   citizenry.   Solid   waste
management should primarily be dealt with
through local mechanisms. And so forth. In
designing a decentralization strategy it is
imperative that such an analysis be done.”
(UNDP,   1998).   The   new   literature   on
political economy of fiscal federalism, goes
far   beyond   the   earlier   issues   of
centralization   and   decentralization.  Now
the   case   is   for   the   center   to   assume
sophisticated   styles   of   remaining   ‘in
charge’   (stewardship/   leadership)   and
constructing   such   support   structures,
processes and national institutions which
create   enabling   environment
4  (in   which
subnational   autonomy   is   tolerated   and
treasured), build local capacity and provide
appropriate incentives for the  subantional
governments to behave responsibly while
allowing center to perform its new role in
changed political and economic conditions.
The best design for decentralization, in the
last analysis however, will vary according to
circumstances and situations.
Conclusion: 
The   paper   has   argued   that   ‘designing
decentralization’ is a very specific   issue
and   is   to   be   worked   out   differently   in
different   contexts.   In   addition   there   are
certain dimensions of the political economy
of fiscal federalism
5  “in particular country-
specific context” that   must not be ignored.
It is also clear that an improper attempt at
fiscal decentralization in fact, could be a
disaster-prone strategy while  the “proper”
distribution of tax authority and expenditure
responsibility   is   an   extremely   complex
issue.   The   problem   in   many   cases
according to Prud’homme is not what to
decentralize (or whether a service should
be provided by a central, regional or local
government ) but, rather  how  to organize
the joint production (shared rule) of the
service   by   various   levels   (Prud’homme,
1995) The riddle can be solved only if a
comprehensive   view   of   the   political
economy of fiscal federalism is considered
instead   of   a   narrow   approach   to   fiscal
decentralization.
Since success of decentralization depends
on its design, an overall improvement in the
political,   fiscal   and   administrative
institutions   of   decentralization   is   a
precondition before embarking on the
 path
of decentralization. “But decentralization is
often implemented haphazardly. Decision
makers do not always fully control the pace
and   genesis   of   the   decentralization
process.” (WB1999). Thus what is required
is that decentralization as it is understood
and pursued in recent times must not be
detached   from   broader   and   constantly
expanding perspective on fiscal federalism,
the intellectual lineage of which can only
offer   a   framework   for   successful
decentralization. 
The   conceptual   framework   of   fiscal
decentralization is well established in fiscal
federalism literature, drawing largely on the
contributions   by   Stigler,   Samuelson,
Musgrave,   Oates,   and   Brennan   and
Buchanan the understanding of which is
further   expanding   with   the   emerging
second   generation   theory   of   fiscal
federalism   with   important   contributions
from Inman and Rubinfields , Weingast and
others.. The central logic is that the core
issues   of   growth   and   poverty   (the
justification offered for economic reforms
across the globe after failure of the earlier
paradigms) cannot be addressed without
addressing   efficiency—‘supplying
services up to the point at which, at
the   margin,   the   welfare   benefit   to
society matches its cost’.
Though the conceptual framework of
fiscal   decentralization   is   well
established   in   fiscal   federalism
literature   yet   there   is   no   set   of
prescribed   rules   for   fiscal
decentralization. Roy Bhal, however
on the basis of best practices in fiscal
federalism delineates twelve rules for
fiscal decentralization which are well
grounded   in   the   theory   of   fiscal
federalism. These are: Roy Bahl’s XII
Rules for Fiscal Decentralization:  1.
Fiscal   decentralization   should   be
viewed as a comprehensive system.
2. Finance follows function. 3. There
must be a strong central ability to
monitor and evaluate decentralization
4.   One   intergovernmental   system
does   not   fit   the   urban   and   rural
sector.   5.   Fiscal   decentralization
requires significant local government
taxing power. 6. Central government
must keep the fiscal decentralization
rules that it makes. 7.Keep it simple
8. The design of intergovernmental
transfer   system   must   match   the
objectives of decentralization reform.
9.   Fiscal   decentralization   should
consider   all   the   three   levels   of
government.   10.   Impose   a   hard
budget constraint. 11.Recognize that
Intergovernmental   systems   are
always in transition, plan for this. 12.
There must be a champion for fiscal
decentralization.  (Meaning  that   one
must defeat very strong centralization
arguments.
Thus,   to   proceed   with   fiscal
decentralization   while   detaching   it
from federal dimensions and political
economy considerations inherent in
fiscal   federalism   is   no   doubt
dangerous. At this point it needs to
be asserted that while bringing about
fiscal decentralization in any country
(whether   unitary   or   federal,
developing,   transitional   or
industrialized);   the   principles   of
political economy of fiscal federalism
should not be lost sight of. The term
fiscal  federalism   according  to Nieo
Grornrndijk   (2002   p1)   “is   often
wrongfully associated with the theory
of   fiscal   decentralization   within
federal states only”. It is applicable
even to non federal states (having no
formal   federal
constitutional/institutional
arrangement) also in the sense that
they   encompass   different   levels   of
government   which   have   de   facto
decision making authority. David King
(1984) thus highlights that the ideas
of fiscal federalism are applicable to
a range of structures of government,
including   unitary   states.  While
drawing   attention   to   this   aspect
Jamie   Boex   (2001)   stresses   that
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countries,   regardless   whether   they   are
unitary   countries,   federal   countries   or
confederations”.   Though   the   manner   in
which the principle will be applied will differ
in each case as the unitary and federal
governments   provide   different
opportunities for fiscal decentralization due
to divergence in their respective political
and legislative context. However, it must
be reasserted that to regain the dynamic
stability inherent in fiscal federalism, there
is a need to “put federal back into fiscal
federalism” (Michael Keen, 1998) which is
notable in decentralization literature only
by   its   absence   and   which   has   been
identified   as   one   cause   behind
‘decentralization failure’. It must be added
here that “adherence to the principles of
federalism or getting the rules of the game
right is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition   for   success   of   decentralized
decision   making.   Complementary   formal
and   informal   institutions   are   needed   to
ensure that all players in the game adhere
to agreed upon set of ground rules and
deviant   behavior   is   properly   dealt   with.
This will need:
•  Institutions   and   Processes   of
Intergovernmental Coordination.
•  Institutional   Arrangements   for   Fiscal
Relations
•  Institutions   of   Accountability.”
(Shah,2004 p 31-34)
End Notes: 
1.   As   William   Dillinger   and   Stewen
B.Webb   (1999)   put   it,   “it  is   difficult   to
imagine what the restoration of democracy
would have been like without substantial
political decentralization—federalism—and
some   concomitant   form   of   fiscal
decentralization”.   Dillinger,   William   and
Stewen   B.Webb   (1999)  Fiscal
Management   in   Federal   democracies:
Argentina and Brazil, World Bank Working
paper No : 2121 (Washington May 1999).
2. Importance of accountability lies in the
fact   that   it   clearly   demarcates   who   is
responsible for what. But accountability is
not enough. Those who are accountable
must also have the authority to  deliver
results. This means not merely the legal
authority to make decisions, but also the
financial (and human) resources to carry
them   out.   This   in   fact   is   the   common
theme that runs through the six chapters of
the World Bank study entitled Beyond the
Center: Decentralizing the State by  Burki
Shahid   Javed,Guillermo   E.   Perry,   and
William R. Dillinger. (1999). 
3.  The  European   Economic   Community
came into existence in 1957 and was the
result of a sustained effort to create a
sense of common European purpose. The
first   six   Member   States   were   Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and
the   Netherlands.   Other   Member   States
subsequently.The   European   Union   was
established   in   November,   1993   on   the
entry   into   force   of   the   Treaty   on   the
European Union  (The Maastricht Treaty).
This   Treaty   conferred   important   new
powers   on   the   European   Parliament
including co-decision making on legislation.
4.   ‘Enabling   environment’   means-
institutions   of   citizen   participation   and
accountability. Anwar Shah adds the notion
of – “authorizing environment” which in his
words,   “represents   the   institutional
mechanisms   to   translate   constitutional
mission to concrete objectives and actions.
These include societal norms, formal and
informal   rules,   procedures   and
organizations   dealing   with   participation,
consultation,   policy   making   and
accountability. Legislative coordination and
oversight bodies are important elements of
authorizing environment. These institutions
ensure that public sector is solely focused
on citizen aspirations.” (Shah, 2004, p6).
5.   The   political   economy   of   a   fiscal
federation   in   which   spending   is
decentralized and taxation is not (as in the
Scottish case) is very different from one in
which taxation is decentralized as well (as
in the US). Further political economy of
fiscal federalism in a developing country
attempting to decentralize is different from
a developed country on account of   the
unintended   consequences   that   relatively
less   developed   institutions   of
accountability, governance and capacity in
developing   countries   might   have   on
decentralization policies
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